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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, terrorism is analysed using the tools of modern portfolio theory. 
This approach permits the analysis of the returns that a terrorist group can expect 
from their activities as well as the risk that they face. The analysis sheds new light 
on the nature of the terrorist group’s (attack method) choice set and the efficiency 
properties of that set. If terrorist groups are, on average, more risk averse, the 
economist can expect the terrorist group to exhibit a bias towards bombing and 
armed attack. Also, even the riskiest (from the terrorist group’s point of view) 
combinations of attack methods have maximum expected returns of less than 70 
injuries and fatalities per attack per year.   
 
Key Words: Terrorism, Modern Portfolio Theory, Mean-Variance Analysis, 
Efficient Choice Set.   
 
JEL Codes: D00, G11, H56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
APPLYING MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY TO THE ANALYSIS OF 
TERRORISM 
Computing the Set of Attack Method Combinations from which the Rational Terrorist 
Group will Choose in Order to Maximise Injuries and Fatalities 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, one of financial economics’ most important analytical frameworks is utilised in 
the analysis of terrorism. This analytical framework is modern portfolio theory (MPT). MPT 
reduces the problem of capital allocation (in an investment setting) to a mathematical process 
for a utility maximising economic agent during which he or she makes decisions solely on the 
basis of the mean return and variance of returns (risk) exhibited by particular combinations 
(portfolios) of assets. It is the objective of this analysis to apply these mean-variance methods 
to the analysis of terrorism. In so doing we can derive important results, most significantly the 
efficient set of combinations of terrorist attack methods that yield the maximum 
injuries/fatalities for any given level of risk. A utility maximising terrorist group will only 
choose combinations of attack methods that lie in the efficient set. Knowing what the set 
looks like may be useful.  
 
“Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal violence or brutality by 
sub-national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through 
intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that 
terrorists seek to influence” (Enders and Sandler, 2002). This definition is quite similar to that 
formulated in various parts of the literature and by various research groups, including RAND. 
Whilst terrorists may appear to behave irrationally, the behaviour they exhibit is cold and 
calculating in many ways (Hoffman, 1998). An objective is clearly formulated and resources 
are deployed, subject to constraints, in order to achieve that objective. These characteristics of 
terrorist behaviour make the economic analysis of terrorism both possible and appropriate. 
Such analysis has a long history dating to at least the 1970s. During the course of this long 
application of economic analysis to terrorism, many different methods and tools have been 
deployed.  
 
The key element of any basic economic model of terrorist behaviour is a rational actor 
expected utility framework where utility is derived from some variable that the terrorist or 
terrorist group is assumed to desirei, usually political influence. From the axioms of expected 
utility theory (completeness, transitivity, continuity etc) a utility function is derived that 
expresses the terrorist group’s feelings about a choice involving risk. The terrorist group is 
assumed to attempt to maximise the function subject to various constraints on time and 
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resources (money, suicide bombers and materials). Even on its own, the basic prototype 
model yields some important results. An enhanced probability of failure or a diminished 
payoff decreases the utility or satisfaction that a terrorist group can expect from a particular 
attack. Such analysis lends support to deterrence policies that increase the costs or decrease 
the benefits of terrorism. This is the starting point of most economic analysis of terrorism.  
 
Beginning from this basic expected utility framework, economists have brought to bear a 
wide range of analytical tools on the problem of terrorism. Econometric tools and time series 
techniques have been used to analyse the empirical data that has been gathered on terrorism 
and terrorist behaviour. For example, Enders and Sandler (1993; 2002) use vector 
autoregression (VAR) and threshold autoregression (TAR) to examine patterns in terrorist 
incidents; Im, Cauley and Sandler (1987) use spectral analysis to analyse the cyclical 
behaviour of terrorist activities; Cauley and Im (1988) and Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare 
(1994) deploy ARIMA modelling methods to investigate the effectiveness of government 
retaliation policies following terrorist attacks; and Bapat (2006) uses probit modelling to 
analyse the negotiation between states and trans-national terrorists. Some of the newest 
research in this area is surveyed by Enders (2007). This paper continues the research 
programme of analysing time series terrorism dataii.  
 
Another component of the economics of defence literature is that which is concerned with the 
impact of terrorism on the financial markets. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, financial 
markets exhibited substantial volatility. A number of researchers have examined the impact of 
terrorism on financial markets. Eldor and Melnick (2004) analysed the reaction of Israeli 
stock markets and foreign exchange markets to terror attacks. Chen and Siems (2004) utilised 
the event study methodology that has been used in financial economics for many years to 
examine the impact of terrorism on global capital markets. Interestingly, they discovered that, 
whilst terror attacks can significantly shock financial markets in the short term, US capital 
markets are able to absorb such shocks and display considerable resilience in recovering quite 
quickly. Finally, Drakos (2004) utilises the ‘market model’ developed in financial economics 
to examine the effects of the 9/11 attacks on airline stocks. Whilst there are many more 
studies extant in this emerging branch of the defence economics literature, these studies 
provide a flavour of the main trends. The present study builds on this literature by recruiting 
another tool of financial economics to analyse terrorism.  
 
This paper departs from the existing literature in some important ways. First, and most 
importantly, we deploy mean-variance analysis to analyse time series terrorism data. Whilst 
the time series methods mentioned above permit the analysis of patterns, cycles and the 
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impact of particular policies, mean-variance analysis, which proceeds from the same starting 
point (the basic expected utility framework), permits the derivation of the set of attack method 
combinations that yield the highest number of injuries and fatalities (returns to the terrorist 
group) for each level of risk (variance of the returns series). In some ways, this may also be 
viewed as carrying on the process of analysing terrorism using cost-benefit techniques, which 
are similar in principle to the methods used herein (see John and Rosoff (2007)). Second, 
whilst some studies focus on the risk of terrorism (its likelihood and consequences) from the 
policy making point of view (Willis, Morral, Kelly and Medby (2005)), the analysis presented 
herein takes the terrorist group’s perspective and defines risk as the variability in the number 
of injuries and fatalities generated by various combinations of attack methods (returns). The 
more variability (variance) in this returns series, the greater the chance that the actual number 
of injuries and fatalities will diverge from that which was expected. This is the risk facing our 
terrorist group.  
 
It may already be clear that we will assume, in our theoretical model, that the utility terrorists 
derive from terrorist attacks is linked to the number of injuries and fatalities generated by that 
attack. This assumption may be justified as follows. First, the assumption follows indirectly 
from our definition of terrorism. According to the definition provided above, a political (or 
other) objective is pursued through violent intimidation. If injuries and fatalities are an 
important part of this violent intimidation, as is reasonable to expect, then the utility derived 
from the achievement of the political, religious or ideological objective is, at least implicitly, 
some function of the injuries and fatalities that are generated by a particular terrorist attack. 
Under such circumstances, terrorists may be assumed to behave as if they wish to injure or 
kill as many individuals as possible. More injuries and fatalities mean more political, religious 
or ideological influence which means more utility.  
 
Second, in a world where media attention centres upon the number of people killed and 
injured (not just by acts of terrorism but in accidents, murders etc) it seems quite sensible to 
assume that terrorists’ utility is linked to the amount of injury and death that they can cause 
and, therefore, that terrorists behave as if they attempt to maximise the injuries and fatalities 
generated by their attacks. Third, injuries and fatalities are often given high weightings in 
studies that attempt to measure the objectives and the benefits to terrorists of their methods 
(John and Rosoff, 2007) and high weightings in studies that attempt to measure and predict 
the consequences of terrorism for civilians (Willis, Morral, Kelly and Medby (2005)). Fourth, 
Eldor and Melnick (2004) found that the number of victims killed or injured in an attack had 
permanent economic consequences for the stock and foreign exchange markets in Israel. 
Finally, assuming that terrorists behave as if they try to maximise injuries and fatalities from 
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attacks is no less plausible than the assumption that terrorists obtain a wealth payoff from a 
successful attack (Enders and Sandler, 2002).  
 
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section, an overview of modern portfolio 
theory and mean-variance analysis is provided. In the third section, the first pieces of the 
economic theoretical structure deployed in the analysis are constructed. This involves the 
configuration of the representative terrorist group whose activities are the focus of the 
investigation. In the fourth section, the mean and variance characteristics of the various 
terrorist attack methods identified by the RAND Corporation’s MIPT Terrorism Knowledge 
Database are examined. In the fifth section, it is demonstrated how the utility maximising 
terrorist group may benefit from combining attack methods in a ‘portfolio’ in order to take 
advantage of higher returns and lower risks that result from diversification. The efficient set 
of attack combinations is derived. This set, from which the utility maximising terrorist group 
will choose, is the set of attack combinations that have the highest returns for given levels of 
risk. In the sixth section, the question concerning which combination of attacks the terrorist 
group will choose is addressed. In seventh section, some preliminary analysis is undertaken 
concerning the terrorist group’s (dynamic) portfolio selection over time. The eighth section 
concludes the paper.  
 
MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief overview of modern portfolio theory and 
tools. Essentially, mean-variance analysis is a method for constructing and selecting 
combinations (portfolios) of assets that reduces the exercise to a purely mathematical 
exercise. All of the facets of potential portfolios and their constituent assets are assumed to be 
reflected in their mean return and risk (variance of returns). Mean return is a good thing and 
risk is a bad thing. As such, utility maximising economic agents attempt to maximise the 
utility function:  
 
),( RREfU σ=                      (1) 
 
where U  is the agents’s total utility, RE  is the expected return of a portfolio or asset 
( 0/ >RdEdU ) and Rσ  is the standard deviation of the possible divergence of actual returns 
from expected returns ( 0/ <RddU σ ) (Sharpe, 1964, p.428). Markowitz (1952) was among 
the first to realise that agents do not care solely about the return of a portfolio. If that were 
true, agents would simply choose the portfolio with the highest expected return. Rather, (risk 
averse) agents also care about the risk of the portfolio. Markowitz’s definition of risk as the 
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variability of returns (measured by variance or standard deviation) has long been accepted in 
financial economics and it does appear to capture riskiness in the sense that greater variability 
of returns increases the likelihood that the actual outcome earned by the agent will be 
different from that which was expected. Geometrically, the indifference curves that derive 
from this particular configuration of the (risk averse) individual’s utility are concave-upwards 
in the expected return-risk plane. This is displayed in Figure 1.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Like most parts of economic theory, modern portfolio theory involves economic agents 
attempting to maximise utility by making choices. In the context of modern portfolio theory, 
the choice that must be made is a choice from among a set of possible portfolios. The choice 
set contains all possible portfolios (combinations) of risky assets that can be constructed from 
the risky assets in the economic system. For example, if there are only two assets, A and B, 
we can form various portfolios: (1) 50% in A and B; (2) 40% in A and 60% in B; (3) 30% in 
A and 70% in B and so on. For every possible portfolio we compute the expected return and 
variance. Whilst these values are ex ante in nature, historical (ex post) averages are usually 
used as proxies.  
 
Formally, the expected return on a portfolio is given by:  
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where iw  is the proportion of total investable funds in asset i, ( )iRE is the expected return on 
asset i,  and ∑
=
=
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1. As mentioned above, the mean historic return is usually used as a 
proxy for the return that is expected in the future. The calculation of portfolio returns is quite 
straightforward because the portfolio return is simply the weighted average of the returns on 
the assets in the portfolio. The calculation of portfolio risk (variance) is not so easy. This is 
because the portfolio variance is not a weighted average of the variance exhibited by the 
returns on the assets in the portfolio. Rather, the covariances between the assets must be taken 
into consideration because they can potentially dampen or reinforce each other depending on 
the degree of negative or positive correlation they exhibit. Low or negative correlation among 
assets is the reason why diversification can reduce the risk (and increase the mean return) of a 
portfolio. Formally, the variance of a portfolio is given by:    
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where ijρ  is the correlation coefficient that expresses the degree of correlation between asset 
i and asset j. It should also be noted that jiij σσρ  is equal to the covariance between assets i 
and j ( )ijσ . The double summation sign simply implies that all possible pairs of assets must 
be accounted for in the calculation.  
 
The computation of the return and risk of all possible portfolios (combinations of assets) 
yields the complete opportunity set of portfolios from which the economic agent can make his 
or her choice. Each point in the opportunity set represents a portfolio that the economic agent 
could choose. The economic agents will only be interested in portfolios that lie on the upper 
edge of the opportunity set because these have a higher expected return for each level of risk 
than those portfolios that lie on the underneath edge. The choice problem that faces the 
economic agent can be depicted by superimposing the indifference curve map introduced 
earlier over the opportunity set. This is depicted in Figure 2.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE  
 
The opportunity set depicted in Figure 2 along with the indifference map is called the 
‘efficient set’. It is efficient because it is the set of all portfolios that have minimum variance 
given a particular level of expected return. It is sometimes called the efficient frontier because 
(like a production possibilities frontier (PPF) from economics) it is the farthest to the North 
West that one can go given the assets available in the economic system. The derivation of the 
efficient set is a quadratic programming problem:  
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EXHIBIT 1 The Quadratic Programming Problemiii 
 
Which point (portfolio) should the agent choose? The answer is: the agent should choose the 
portfolio that lies on the point of tangency between the efficient set and his or her indifference 
curve. The indifference curves show that the investor wants to be farther to the North West. 
The efficient set shows how far he or she can go. The point of tangency is therefore the 
portfolio that should be chosen.  
 
Modern portfolio theory provides a framework for analysing the choices of (utility 
maximising) economic agents where such choices are made solely on the basis of two criteria: 
(1) the mean return; and (2) the variance of returns of the universe of portfolios available. In 
the following sections of this paper, the tools of modern portfolio theory are applied to the 
analysis of terrorism and terrorist behaviour. Specifically, mean-variance methods are 
deployed to analyse the return (injuries and fatalities generated by an attack) and risk 
(variance of the returns series) of the various types of attack methods that terrorists may 
choose to deploy. Significantly, mean-variance methods and quadratic programming are 
deployed to derive the efficient set of terrorist attack types. This permits conclusions to be 
reached regarding the risk and return characteristics of various terrorist ‘portfolios’ where 
methods of attack are assigned different weights. We can then see which combinations of 
attacks yield the highest return (injuries and fatalities) for the least risk and which 
combinations of attack methods would be favoured by more risk-averse terrorists and which 
would be favoured by less risk-averse terrorists.  
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THE REPRESENTATIVE TERRORIST GROUP 
Imagine a world inhabited by a representative terrorist group that acts as a stand in for all the 
terrorist groups. The representative group is our theoretical portfolio builder and may be best 
seen as a planner responsible for allocating resources (money, materials, suicide bombers etc) 
in an attempt to maximise a utility function ( )ZU . The group attempts to gain utility by 
obtaining political, religious and ideological influence through violent intimidation. It does so 
by combining different attack methods in a ‘portfolio’ in order to injure and kill as many 
individuals as possible. Letting Z denote the economic (utility giving) goodiv that the terrorist 
group expects to gain from the choice to undertake an act of terrorism, let us make some 
assumptions and provide some definitions: 
 
Assumption 1 The axioms of expected utility theory or rational choice (completeness, 
transitivity and continuity etc)v apply to terrorist behaviour.  
 
Assumption 2 The economic good Z is solely a function of the expected return and risk 
(variance) associated with particular combinations (portfolios) of terrorist 
attack methods. 
 
Definition 1 The risk (from the terrorist group’s point of view) of a terrorist attack is the 
standard deviation of the possible divergence of actual returns from expected 
returns. In practice, ex post standard deviation or variance is a proxy for risk. 
More volatility means a greater chance of an unexpected outcome.   
 
Definition 2 The expected return of a terrorist attack is the number of injuries and 
fatalities that the terrorist group expects to result from the attack. In practice, 
the ex post average return is a proxy for expected return.   
 
These assumptions and the accompanying definitions ensure that it is possible to write a 
quadratic utility function (which is the type of utility function that permits an agent’s first 
order conditions for utility maximisation to be expressed in terms of mean and variance) for 
terrorist group as follows: 
 
22)1( RRR cbEEbU σ−++=                            (4) 
 
where RE  and 
2
Rσ  denote expected return and variance of return respectively, b is a 
parameter that adheres to the restriction – 1 < b < 0 when terrorists are risk averse and c is a 
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parameter that adheres to the restriction 0 < c < 1 (see Tobin (1958, p.76)). In essence, this is 
an extension of the standard expected utility rational actor model of terrorist behaviour that 
has been deployed in the economics of defence literature for many years (see Sandler and 
Hartley (1995) and Sandler and Enders (2004)).  
 
This characterisation of the terrorist group’s utility function gives rise to the indifference 
curves of Figure 1 (above). This theoretical framework that we have constructed consists of a 
representative terrorist group (a theoretical planner or portfolio builder) that pursues an 
economic good through the execution of terrorist attacks. The utility derived from this activity 
is solely a function of some economic good that the terrorist group desires, Z, which is, in 
turn, a function of the expected return (expected injuries and fatalities) and risk (variance of 
returns) of the particular type of attack method that is deployed. The terrorist group, therefore, 
seeks to maximise utility by making choices between different combinations of possible 
attack methods on the basis of expected return and risk. This framework permits the mean-
variance analysis of terrorism and terrorist behaviour and allows us to determine the 
combinations of attack methods that yield the highest number of expected injuries and 
fatalities for any given level of risk.   
 
THE RISK AND RETURN OF TERRORIST ATTACK METHODS 
In this section, the risk and return characteristics of various terrorist attack methods are 
analysed before the ‘portfolios’ (combinations of attack methods) are constructed and 
analysed in the following section. The data used in this analysis are data that have been 
collected in the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base database under the auspices of the RAND 
Corporation. The data collected in this database are extremely detailed and cover the thirty-
nine year period between 1968 and 2007. The statistical data is categorised by terrorist tactic 
and includes the number of attacks per year and the number of injuries and fatalities that the 
attacks caused. Before 1997, only international attacks (where a terrorist crosses a border to 
undertake an attack, attacks the domestic interests of a foreign entity or stages an attack on an 
airline) were recorded in the database. Post 1997, both international and domestic are 
recorded.  
 
These data are used to compute the time series of returns (injuries and fatalities) for various 
attack methods and their risks (variance in the returns series). We do this for individual 
attacks in this section and for combinations of attacks in the next section. The rationale is as 
follows. Essentially, our representative terrorist group forms expectations about the likely 
return and risk (variance) for a particular attack or combination of attacks on the basis of the 
injuries and fatalities and the variability of the injuries and fatalities exhibited by the 
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historical times series. As explained above, historical mean returns and variance are proxies 
for the expected return and risk of planned attacks. We can imagine, therefore, our 
representative group using the historical time series data analysed herein to form expectations 
about the likely return and risk of attack methods and combinations of attack methods that it 
plans to use in the future. The data for 2001 are provided in Table 1 as an example. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Using the complete data set for 1968 to 2007, a series of returnsvi generated by each type of 
attack was generated. This returns series, which forms the basis for the mean-variance 
analysis, is presented in Table 2.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The interesting feature of the returns series is that the injuries and fatalities generated per 
attack per year are in most cases quite low with significant ‘spikes’ occurring relatively 
infrequently. For example, the returns generated by armed attacks and unconventional attacks 
are quite low but on two occasions (1995 for armed attacks and 2001 for unconventional 
attacks) there were significant increases in injuries and fatalities per armed and 
unconventional attack. The returns series for bombing attacks is quite volatile which indicates 
that such activity, whilst usually generating steady, low returns, can occasionally deliver 
substantially higher outcomes. On the other hand, the returns series for assassination, 
kidnapping and arson are, by and large, relatively stable and yield consistent but low returns 
for the terrorist involved in such activities. The characteristics of the returns series are 
displayed in Figures 3 and 4.  
 
INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE 
 
The representative terrorist group that seeks to maximise its utility will, according to the 
theoretical framework introduced in the previous section, not only be interested in the 
expected return (average return) of a particular type of attack but also its risk (variance of 
returns). The charts presented above already reveal some of the mean-variance characteristics 
of terrorist attack methods. Precise calculation yields summary statistics that highlight the risk 
and return characteristics of particular attack types. These are displayed in Table 3.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
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Not surprisingly, a higher expected return (higher expected injury and fatality) is usually 
accompanied by a higher risk (variance of the returns series). In the pursuit of an economic 
good, the terrorist group finds that there is no free lunch. By and large, the terrorist group that 
wishes to achieve a higher return from its activity must bear the cost of higher risk and accept 
the higher probability of a divergence of the actual outcome of the terrorist incident from the 
outcome that was expected. However, the terrorist group might not be interested in one 
particular type of attack. Rather, it might decide to ‘diversify’ and utilise a combination 
(portfolio) of attack methods. Indeed, modern portfolio theory implies that diversification can 
reduce the risk and increase the expected return of a portfolio. Our utility-maximising 
representative terrorist group could therefore be expected to combine attack types. In the 
following section, we analyse the return and risk characteristics of combinations (portfolios) 
of attack methods. 
 
MEAN-VARIANCE ANALYSIS OF COMBINATIONS OF ATTACK TYPES 
The terrorist group can combine different attack methods into a ‘portfolio’ and, in so doing, 
can reduce its exposure to risk (the variance of the returns) whilst at the same time increasing 
expected returns (the expected injuries and fatalities from the combination of attack methods). 
The reason why this approach works is that the time series of injuries and fatalities generated 
by the various terrorist attack methods do not exhibit perfect correlation. There is, therefore, 
the opportunity for the utility maximising representative terrorist group to reduce risk by 
combining different attack methods in an overall terrorist portfolio. For example, for the 
period 1968 to 2007, armed attacks exhibit negative covariance vis-à-vis hijacking; bombing 
exhibited negative covariance vis-à-vis unconventional methods; and armed attacks exhibited 
negative covariance vis-à-vis assassination. Combining such methods dampens the variance 
exhibited by individual methods and yields a ‘portfolio’ with a lower risk than an individual 
method taken on its own. The covariance between each possible pair of attack methods can be 
displayed in the (non-weighted) covariance matrix Table 4.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The non-weighted covariance matrix presents the results of a covariance calculation for each 
possible pair of attack types. The values along the main diagonal are, of course, simply the 
variances of the particular attack types. The other values in the remaining cells of the matrix 
are the covariances between the various pairs of attack methods. Combined into a ‘portfolio’ 
the risk (variance) associated with the various individual terrorist attack methods may dampen 
the overall level of risk faced by the representative terrorist group. The variances and 
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covariances in Table 4 are used, in conjunction with predefined weights iw , to compute the 
risk (variance) associated with a combination (portfolio) of terrorist attack methods. That is, 
the result of Equation 3 (above). For example, an equal weighted combination consisting of a 
devotion of 10 per cent of time and resources to each attack method yields the weighted 
covariance matrix presented in Table 5. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
This equal weighted combination of terrorist attack methods (where each attack method 
represents 10 per cent of the overall portfolio) has an expected return of 15.55022 injuries and 
fatalities per attack in a given year and a risk (standard deviation) of 5.958 injuries and 
fatalities per attack in a given year (computed using Equations 2 and 3). This is a much higher 
expected (average) return than any of the terrorist attack methods undertaken individually and 
a much lower risk than that exhibited by particular individual attack types. This indicates that 
the economist may expect our representative terrorist group to diversify among attack types 
and select a combination of methods that maximises its utility given its particular preferences 
for risk. Since particular combinations will dominate (possess a higher expected return for a 
given level of risk) other combinations, the utility maximising terrorist group will select from 
the set of efficient combinations (in the sense of Figure 2).  
 
THE TERRORIST GROUP’S EFFICIENT SET 
The computation of the efficient set of terrorist attack combinations is an exercise in quadratic 
programming, involving the solution of the quadratic programming problem presented in 
Exhibit 1. This is undertaken as follows: (1) form random combinations (portfolios) of 
terrorist attack methods by randomly assigning weights to the ten attack types (adhering to the 
constraint that the weights are positive and sum to one); (2) compute the expected return and 
variance for each randomly generated portfolio; and (3) solve the quadratic programming 
problem that results by maximising the expected return subject to the constraints on the 
weighting scheme and the restriction that the variance be equal to the randomly generated 
portfolio. The outcome is a set of weights for an efficient portfolio yielding a higher expected 
return than the random portfolio but having equal variance. Undertaking this exercise many 
times will permit the derivation of the efficient set.  
 
In order to derive the terrorist group’s efficient set, the procedure outlined in the previous 
paragraph was undertaken fifty (50) times. That is, fifty randomly assigned weighting 
schemes were generated and the resulting portfolio expected return and risk calculated. For 
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each portfolio the quadratic programming problem was solved. The geometrical 
representation of the efficient set is derived by plotting the expected return and standard 
deviation of the efficient combinations in expected return-risk space. Of course, one could 
derive and plot the entire opportunity set (including inefficient combinations) but, since utility 
maximising agents are only interested in the efficient set, that is all that need concern us here. 
This is displayed in Figure 5. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE  
 
The terrorist group’s efficient set is analogous to the efficient set described by modern 
portfolio theory. All combinations of terrorist attack methods that lie on the efficient frontier 
dominate portfolios that lie in the interior of the choice set. The efficient portfolios have 
higher expected injuries and fatalities (returns) for each level of risk (variance of the returns 
series) than their inefficient counterparts. Interestingly, even the riskiest combinations yield a 
maximum expected return (injuries and fatalities per incident per year) of less than 70 injuries 
and fatalities per incident per year. This is probably much lower than that which would have 
been expected by most scholars and the computation of the efficient frontier yields us this 
piece of information.  
 
WHICH EFFICIENT COMBINATION WILL THE TERRORIST GROUP CHOOSE? 
The question that is of obvious importance to governments and policymakers concerns which 
efficient combination the terrorist group will choose. It is possible to make a number of 
predictions regarding the behaviour of our representative terrorist group. First and foremost, it 
is possible to identify which combinations of attack methods will be favoured by less risk-
averse groups and which combinations of attack methods will be favoured by more risk-
averse groups. Combined with further information concerning the risk aversion coefficients of 
terrorists, this may one day prove to be a very useful policy tool. For now, however, we 
simply identify a few combinations that may be favoured by (1) a more risk-averse terrorist 
group; and (2) a less risk-averse terrorist group. Specifically, more risk-averse groups will 
prefer combinations that lie on the lower (South West) portion of the efficient set and less 
risk-averse groups will prefer combinations that lie on the upper (North East) portion of the 
efficient set. This is displayed in Figure 6. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
 
An important question concerns the types of attacks that may constitute the portfolio of a 
more risk-averse terrorist group and the types of attacks that may constitute a less risk-averse 
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terrorist group. These are depicted in Figure 7. Figure 7 may be used to examine the 
characteristics of portfolios that may be chosen by our utility maximising terrorist group for 
different levels of risk aversion.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
 
The portfolios identified are in Figure 7 are just two of the infinite number of possible 
portfolios that may be chosen. Each point on the efficient set represents a different portfolio 
and not every portfolio contains every attack method. However, on average, there appears to 
be a tendency toward a preference for bombing and armed attack in the lower risk portion of 
the efficient set and a tendency toward a preference for unconventional attack methods in the 
higher risk portion of the efficient set. On average, higher expected returns will be derived 
from undertaking more risky attack methods. However, the actual returns generated by these 
risky attack methods may vary considerably from the return the terrorist group expected. If 
terrorist groups are, on average, more averse to risk, the economist can expect a bias towards 
bombing and armed attack to be exhibited in the terrorist group’s behaviour. This is our only 
clear result here.  
 
Each combination of attack methods in the efficient set may potentially be chosen by our 
utility maximising terrorist group. The negative covariance exhibited between the injuries and 
fatalities generated by various attack methods provides the benefits from diversification that 
we expect our representative group to exploit. This diversification may lead our terrorist 
group to devote resources to attack methods that would otherwise seem unusual (such as 
hijacking in a world with high airport security). Here we must understand that (1) the negative 
covariance that hijacking exhibits vis-à-vis other methods (see Table 4) means that its 
inclusion in the terrorist group’s portfolio reduces the variance of the portfolio’s expected 
returns; (2) as the activity becomes more difficult, its expected return increases to compensate 
for the higher riskvii. This is a product of the ex ante nature of this analysis. A particular attack 
method may seem impossible or implausible to policy makers but a terrorist group making a 
risk/return trade-off may still devote some resources to it if the expected return compensates 
for the higher risk. Hijacking (or any other attack method) may be included (as depicted in 
Figure 7) in an efficient portfolio and any of the efficient portfolios might be chosen by the 
rational utility maximising agent. Our main conclusion here remains that, if terrorist groups 
are, on average, more averse to risk, the economist can expect a bias towards bombing and 
armed attack to be exhibited in the terrorist group’s behaviour. 
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THE DYNAMIC BEHAVIOUR OF OUR REPRESENTATIVE GROUP 
Mean-variance analysis is one component of modern portfolio theory. Other components of 
this body of theoretical work may be deployed in the analysis of terrorism and terrorist 
behaviour. The theoretical work that has been undertaken on the optimality conditions for 
portfolio selection under different circumstances may be of some use in developing a purely 
theoretical response to questions concerning the dynamic behaviour of the terrorist group and 
how it adjusts its portfolio over time. Whilst a complete theoretical investigation is left for 
future research, it is possible to identify the behaviour a utility maximising terrorist group 
might exhibit under certain circumstances in its selection of combinations of attack types.   
 
Terrorist groups may have different types of risk aversion. The type of risk aversion exhibited 
by the group influences its preferences for more risky attack methods as its stock of the 
economic good Z changes (see above). There are two ways in which preferences for risky 
attack methods may be described: (1) absolutely; or (2) relatively. Agents may exhibit 
increasing, constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. An agent who exhibits increasing, 
decreasing or constant absolute risk aversion will devote less, more or the same amount of 
resources to more risky attack methods as its stock of Z increases. Similarly, agents may 
exhibit increasing, constant or decreasing relative risk aversion. This will decide the 
percentage of their resources they invest in more risky attack methods as their stock of Z 
changes. An agent who exhibits increasing, decreasing or constant relative risk aversion will 
devote a lesser, greater or unchanged percentage of resources to more risky attack methods as 
its stock of Z increases. 
 
The configuration of terrorist groups’ utility functions is important and relevant to the task of 
constructing optimal combinations of attack methods. Within the context of theoretical 
financial economics, Merton (1969) derived the ‘optimality equations for a multi-asset 
problem’ in a continuous time setting where rates of return are generated by a Wiener 
process. Analogically, for the case where terrorist groups exhibit constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA)—that is, the percentage of resources devoted to more risky attack methods 
remains constant as the group’s stock of Z changes—the optimal consumption (of Z) and 
portfolio selection rules follow from the solution of the system of nonlinear partial differential 
equations (Merton, 1969, p.250): 
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subject to [ ] teTTZI ργε −−= 1),(  and [ ] 10for ,/)( <<< εγγTZ  where Z(t) is total stock of 
the terroristic agent’s economic good at time t, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , C(t) is consumption per unit of 
time, wi(t) is the proportion of total resources devoted to the ith attack method at time t, 
[ ]ttZIIt ),(≡ , r is the return on a ‘sure’ asset and γ−1 is Pratt’s measure of relative risk 
aversion, 
)(
)()(
ZU
ZUZZRR ′
′′−= .  
 
For terrorist groups with constant relative risk aversion, it is optimal to follow a time-
invariant portfolio selection policy with frequent ‘rebalancing’ of the portfolio after 
fluctuations in the returns seriesviii. If, for example, the weighting scheme of the terrorist 
group’s portfolio is characterised by 51% hostage, 47% unconventional and 2% armed 
attacks, the weighting of unconventional attack methods would be reduced following a period 
where such attacks were particularly successful (because after such a period, more than 47% 
of total resources would be devoted to unconventional attack methods). Being time-invariant, 
the policy is followed regardless of the terrorist group’s time horizon (Browne, Milevsky and 
Salisbury, 2003). The economist would expect, therefore, to find a period characterised by the 
successful deployment of particular attack methods to be followed by a period where such 
attack methods are less prevalent.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the tools of modern portfolio theory were applied to an analysis of terrorism and 
terrorist behaviour. Our representative terrorist group pursues some objective, Z, through 
violent intimidation. The utility derived from this activity is solely a function of some 
economic good that the terrorist group desires, Z, which is, in turn, a function of the expected 
return (expected injuries and fatalities) and risk (variance of returns) of the particular type of 
attack method that is deployed. The terrorist group, therefore, seeks to maximise utility by 
making choices between different combinations of possible attack methods on the basis of its 
expected return and risk. This framework permitted the mean-variance analysis of terrorism 
and terrorist behaviour and allowed us to determine the combinations of attack methods that 
yield the highest number of expected injuries and fatalities for any given level of risk. The 
main results and predictions obtained from the analysis presented in this paper may be stated:  
 
1. Armed attacks, barricade/hostage, bombing and unconventional attack methods exhibit the 
highest expected returns but also exhibit considerably higher risk than most of the other attack 
methods that the terrorist group may choose from.  
 
2. Hijacking currently has a low expected return relative to armed attacks, barricade/hostage, 
bombing and unconventional attacks. However, it has a reasonably high risk for the terrorist 
group (twice as risky as bombing). Presently, hijackings would not appeal to our (risk averse) 
terrorist group except as a means to dampen the risk of the overall portfolio. This will remain 
the case until expected returns to hijackings increase or the risk (variance) declines. Of 
course, a risk seeking agent may be especially attracted to hijacking in the present 
circumstances.  
 
3. The combination of attack types in a ‘portfolio’ reduces the terrorist group’s risk whilst 
increasing his or her expected returns. This demonstrates that terrorism is not exempt from 
benefits derived from diversification.   
 
4. Utility maximising terrorist groups may be expected to choose combinations of attack 
methods that lie in the efficient set. The identification of the efficient set by this analysis 
provides the combinations of attack methods that yield the highest expected return for a given 
level of risk.  
 
5. The exact choice of portfolio depends upon the terrorist group’s risk aversion. More risk-
averse groups will choose portfolios more heavily weighted towards armed attacks and 
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bombing whilst less risk-averse groups will choose portfolios more heavily weighted towards 
barricade/hostage and unconventional methods.  
 
6. Even the riskiest combinations of attack methods have an expected return of less than 70 
injuries and fatalities per attack per year. This result may be surprising to some analysts. The 
mean-variance method provides this piece of information.  
 
7. If terrorist groups exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), the optimal portfolio 
selection and consumption conditions imply a constant proportional strategy where the group 
re-weights the portfolio following fluctuations in returns. The key prediction that results from 
this part of the analysis is that CRRA terrorist groups will devote fewer resources to a 
particular method following the successful deployment of that method.   
 
The predictions generated by the analysis are, at least in principle, empirically testable. It 
would appear most appropriate to state, in conclusion, that the most important task facing the 
economist who wishes to analyse terrorist behaviour is the determination of the exact 
properties of terrorist agents’ utility functions, particularly the level and type of risk aversion 
these individuals exhibit. 
 
                                                 
i See Anderton and Carter (2005; 2006) for a discussion of the utility maximisation model applied to 
terrorism. 
ii And the application of analytical tools developed in finance or financial economics to the analysis of 
terrorism and terrorist behaviour (see Phillips (2005)). Although of peripheral relevance, this paper also 
adds to the literature on price and substitution effects (Faria (2006); Frey and Luechinger (2003)).  
iii Source: Strong, R. 2006, p.155.  
iv An economic good is something that is desired but which costs something to obtain. In this case, it is 
usually assumed to be political power and resources or a monetary equivalent.  
v Completeness: given situations A and B an individual can always specify if A is preferred to B, B is 
preferred to A or A and B are equally attractive; Transitivity: If A is preferred to B and B to C, then A 
is preferred to C; Continuity: if A is preferred to B then a situation suitably close to A is preferred to B. 
vi ( )
incidents
fatalities  injuries TypeAttack  on Return +== iRi  
vii Also see Phillips (2005) and, for different perspective, Faria (2006).  
viii Assuming that successful (unsuccessful) attacks increase (decrease) the terrorist’s resources and that 
these resources are ‘reinvested’ in the same successful (unsuccessful) attack methods. See Enders and 
Sandler (2002).  
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FIG. 2. Optimal Portfolio Choice 
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FIG. 3. Returns: Armed Attack, Barricade/Hostage, Hijacking, Unconventional 
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FIG. 4. Returns: Arson, Assassination, Bombing, Kidnapping, Other, Unknown 
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FIG. 5. Terrorist Group’s Efficient Set 
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FIG. 6. Choices of Terrorist Groups 
 
 
 26
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Risk (standard deviation)
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 R
et
ur
n
Portfolio Weights (approximate) = 0.14 (Armed Attack), 0.01 (Assassination), 0.11 (Hostage), 
0.43 (Bombing), 0.17 (Hijacking), 0.10 (Unconventional), 0 (Arson, Kidnapping, Other and 
Unknown).
Portfolio Weights (approximate) = 0.01 (Armed Attack), 0.51 (Hostage), 0.47 (Unconventional), 
0 (Arson, Assassination, Bombing, Hijacking, Kidnapping, Other and Unknown).
Approximate Position of Terrorists’ January 
2007 Portfolio
 
FIG. 7. Portfolio Constituents: More and Less Risk Averseix 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Terrorist Incidents by Tactic 01/01/2001 to 01/01/2002x 
TACTIC INCIDENTS INJURIES FATALITIES 
Armed Attack 294 509 424 
Arson 86 14 1 
Assassination 174 70 234 
Barricade/Hostage 5 0 5 
Bombing 1035 3239 762 
Hijacking 4 1 3 
Kidnapping 69 7 50 
Other 21 194 11 
Unconventional  20 2360 2999 
Unknown 32 21 90 
TOTAL 1740 6415 4579 
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TABLE 2. Returns Generated by Terrorist Attacks 01/01/1968 to 01/01/2007 
Armed Attack Arson Assassination Hostage Bombing Hijacking Kidnapping Other Unconventional Unknown
1968 1.714 0.000 1.250 0.000 2.238 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1969 1.125 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.962 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1970 0.588 0.000 3.125 0.500 1.913 0.105 0.308 0.000 0.000 0.000
1971 0.300 0.000 1.250 0.000 0.906 2.429 0.125 0.000 0.000 25.000
1972 11.200 0.000 0.182 3.667 0.833 1.643 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1973 3.938 0.000 1.071 2.000 1.213 0.333 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000
1974 6.000 0.000 1.000 4.500 1.655 0.286 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000
1975 3.118 0.000 1.667 7.818 2.612 4.500 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000
1976 1.381 0.000 1.344 16.000 3.794 9.250 0.526 0.000 0.000 0.000
1977 0.950 0.000 1.524 0.750 2.013 7.769 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.000
1978 4.425 0.000 1.263 1.273 2.217 3.000 0.313 0.000 1.000 0.000
1979 1.243 0.000 2.231 56.615 3.159 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.000 0.000
1980 1.577 0.000 1.175 4.692 2.348 1.333 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000
1981 1.545 0.000 1.057 1.429 6.984 1.182 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000
1982 5.778 0.250 1.273 0.833 2.509 0.125 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.000
1983 0.667 1.000 1.407 4.000 6.869 0.000 0.417 0.000 0.000 0.000
1984 1.667 0.000 1.130 0.000 2.560 0.556 0.135 0.333 0.000 0.000
1985 1.615 2.000 1.444 1.667 6.639 8.000 0.220 0.000 0.000 0.000
1986 2.756 0.000 1.050 0.000 4.841 62.000 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000
1987 1.940 0.000 1.259 0.571 6.435 0.667 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.500
1988 3.147 0.000 1.056 0.600 9.642 2.250 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000
1989 2.000 0.385 1.304 0.000 2.900 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.000
1990 2.860 0.231 1.720 0.000 1.481 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000
1991 1.571 1.000 1.682 0.000 0.725 0.833 0.350 14.333 0.000 0.000
1992 1.960 0.235 1.538 0.000 3.875 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000
1993 2.053 1.167 1.200 0.857 26.944 1.286 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000
1994 5.404 0.000 0.889 2.333 6.746 5.750 0.615 0.000 0.000 0.000
1995 95.630 3.182 1.471 0.000 11.714 0.000 0.639 0.000 0.000 0.000
1996 3.022 10.500 1.692 2.833 28.421 29.333 0.647 0.000 0.000 0.000
1997 6.088 2.500 1.600 3.000 10.337 0.500 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.000
1998 7.871 0.086 2.149 0.727 10.783 0.600 0.560 1.000 21.333 3.091
1999 3.477 0.049 1.905 0.100 3.505 0.333 0.695 2.400 0.000 1.750
2000 0.971 0.076 2.080 1.833 4.331 0.000 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.182
2001 3.173 0.174 1.747 1.000 3.866 1.000 0.826 9.762 267.950 3.469
2002 3.273 0.192 1.688 91.556 13.197 0.000 0.731 7.000 0.667 2.292
2003 1.832 0.141 2.255 0.000 6.854 6.667 0.737 5.929 0.857 1.500
2004 3.787 3.854 1.492 219.800 7.318 0.000 0.665 1.333 0.000 1.225
2005 2.821 0.500 1.741 13.800 6.732 0.000 1.208 1.595 0.000 1.920
2006 2.943 0.098 4.600 2.000 7.414 0.000 1.601 0.600 0.000 2.474
  
Notes: Using the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database the returns presented in Table 2 were computed for the period 1968 to 2007 by 
computing the result of the formula: ( ) incidents/fatalities  injuries TypeAttack  on Return +== iRi . In effect, this generates a data series that 
tells us the injuries and fatalities per type of attack per year. 
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TABLE 3. Annual Risk and Return Characteristics of Attack Methods 
TACTIC EXPECTED 
(AVERAGE) RETURN 
VARIANCE STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
Armed Attack 5.318 219.25 14.80 
Arson 0.708 3.33 1.82 
Assassination 1.543 0.488 0.698 
Barricade/Hostage 11.455 1420.66 37.69 
Bombing 5.884 36.10 6.00 
Hijacking 3.906 114.06 10.67 
Kidnapping 0.46 0.1176 0.3429 
Other 1.136 8.875 2.97 
Unconventional  7.482 1796.69 42.38 
Unknown 1.113 15.90 3.98 
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TABLE 4. (Non-weighted) Covariance Matrix 01/01/1968 to 01/01/2007 
Incidents Armed Attack Arson Assassination Hostage Bombing Hijacking Kidnapping Other Unconventional Unknown
Armed Attack 219.2502449
Arson 6.005033477 3.332313
Assassination -0.522198862 0.031811 0.4884912
Hostage -23.70661276 15.42445 0.931608855 1420.669
Bombing 14.38596215 7.492671 0.37337457 20.90283 36.10422365
Hijacking -10.10465451 5.664612 -0.874681669 -36.4207 13.85873807 114.0609
Kidnapping 0.589207485 0.060136 0.11379656 2.386932 0.249632827 -0.51154 0.117689522
Other -3.081055916 -0.1782 0.324107298 11.81008 -0.88350004 -2.82455 0.211885121 8.875704
Unconventional -13.47359975 -4.04685 1.744647303 -76.8449 -11.13636209 -21.8026 2.580178194 59.37007 1796.695469
Unknown -3.927414343 -0.59467 0.131404687 0.51013 -2.438528886 -2.37358 -0.024761939 0.589395 17.26820766 15.90871
 
 
 
TABLE 5. Equal Weighted Covariance Matrix 01/01/1968 to 01/01/2007 
Incidents Armed Attack Arson Assassination Hostage Bombing Hijacking Kidnapping Other Unconventional Unknown
Armed Attack 2.192502449
Arson 0.060050335 0.033323
Assassination -0.005221989 0.000318 0.004884912
Hostage -0.237066128 0.154244 0.009316089 14.20669
Bombing 0.143859622 0.074927 0.003733746 0.209028 0.361042236
Hijacking -0.101046545 0.056646 -0.008746817 -0.36421 0.138587381 1.140609
Kidnapping 0.005892075 0.000601 0.001137966 0.023869 0.002496328 -0.00512 0.001176895
Other -0.030810559 -0.00178 0.003241073 0.118101 -0.008835 -0.02825 0.002118851 0.088757
Unconventional -0.134735998 -0.04047 0.017446473 -0.76845 -0.111363621 -0.21803 0.025801782 0.593701 17.96695469
Unknown -0.039274143 -0.00595 0.001314047 0.005101 -0.024385289 -0.02374 -0.000247619 0.005894 0.172682077 0.159087
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FIG. 4. Returns: Arson, Assassination, Bombing, Kidnapping, Other, Unknown 
 
FIG. 5. Terrorist Group’s Efficient Set 
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ix This compares to actual weights computed in January 2007 as follows: 0.39 (Armed Attacks), 0.015 
(Arson), 0.013 (Assassination), 0.0008 (Hostage), 0.500 (Bombing), 0.00 (Hi-Jacking), 0.0544 
(Kidnapping), 0.00085 (Other), 0.00016 (Unconventional), 0.012 (Unknown). This is a combination 
with an expected return of 9.55 and a standard deviation (risk) 6.73.  
x Source: RAND Corporation MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database 
